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THE PROBLEM OF JAPANESE EMIGRATION 
By Kazuichiro ONO* 
I. Tendency in the Problem of Emigration and 
Its Intrinsic Nature 
The problem of international emigration assumed a new aspect after the 
first World War. The third convention of the Comintern in 1921, pointed it 
out in the following vein: 
"Emigration of laborers and farmers to vast continents across the oceans 
has always served a safety valve for the capitalistic system in Europe. Emi-
gration assumed added proportions at a time of continued stagnation and after 
the collapse of a revolutionary movement. At the present moment, however, 
both America and Australia have come to set up increasing barriers against 
immigrants, which means that emigration, as a safety valve, is blocked." 
The tendency for a diminution of international emigration, however, had 
been in evidence already between the closing years of the 19th century and 
the initial years of the 20th, when modern imperialism was steadily in the 
making. Between 1880's and 1914, when the first World War broke out, 
Canada and America, Australia and South Mrica, in rapid succession, either 
banned or restricted immigration from China, Japan and India. The trend 
for banning or restricting the yellow-skinned immigrants gained an added mo-
mentum especially after the first World War, and the tendency gradually spread 
to European immigrants, especially from south and east European countries, 
who, thus, were barred from entering the New Continent, hitherto the greatest 
reservoir for foreign immigrants. The number of European immigrants during 
the 1905-1930 period averaged about 1,500,000 persons a year, which, in the 
1921-30 period, decreased to less than 600,000, and to even about 140,000 
during 1931-38.') 
What caused such a vast reduction in the number of immigrants as well 
as strict restriction imposed on their settling? Probably two causes may be cited: 
( I) capitalism had entered into the stage of monopolistic capitalism with 
symptons of stagnancy and decline; economic panics had assumed global pro-
* Assistant Professor of Economics at Kyoto University 
( 1) J. Isaac; "International Migration and European Population Trends," International Labour 
Review, Sept., 1952, p. 188. 
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portions, while chronic business depression had become the order of the day in 
most capitalistic countries, with the consequence that areas to absorb a vast 
army of immigrants had ceased to exist. This, of course, does not mean that 
all the areas on earth had been tapped and explored; it only means that, with 
the completion of a colonial division by imperialiscic countries and the upsurge 
of a strife among them for a re-division of their colonies, competition among 
them for a monopolistic control of the colonial regions had intensified, entail-
ing economic destitution on the part of laborers and farmers, with the inevi-
table result that the very foundations of the capitalistic structure were en-
dangered. These circumstances, combined, worked to block the formation of new 
markets and exploitation of untapped resources, as had been seen in America; 
( 2) the flow of immigrants was apt to bring pressure to bear upon the labor 
market of the country in this stage, where the perpetual existence of the unem-
ployed was increasing, and the consequent competition caused among the labor 
hands unavoidably pressured their wage level, especially the native laborers'. 
This brought about a resentment and antagonism of the native laborers 
against not only immigrants but also the ruling class who had admitted immigrants 
into the country. And, this led to a more intensification of the class struggles 
that had been being intensified in this imperialistic stage. 
Thus, the ruling classes in the immigrant-receiving countries, which had 
been benefiting from their flow in the form of the reduction of the wage level 
and rise in land prices, were gradually compelled, in the face of such situation, 
to place an increasing emphasis on the national consciousness as a means to 
avert an awakening of a class consciousness, and, in the course of such policy, 
alien immigrants, especially the yellow peoples, had to be singled out as a 
target of restriction, and, even prohibition, for the reasons, among others, that 
they were considered detrimental to the growth of such nationalistic sentiments 
while emphasis on the consciousness of a homogeneous race (i. e. White) was 
upheld as the primary essential factor for its growth. Such, however, was fully 
utilised by the ruling classes for veiling their intended domination of the 
subordinate classes. It was exactly on these grounds that, in Canada, Australia 
and South Africa, restriction or shutting-out of yellow-colored emigrants was 
first proposed for the ostensible reasons of their being hardly amenable to 
native social institutions. In the case, specifically, of Japanese settlers, these 
countries evidently were apprehensive of imperialistic inroads, of which the 
Japanese imigrants were considered to be harbingers. Seen in this light, it was 
simply a means made necessary for the maintenance of American and British 
imperialism in a state of stable dominancy. An overall international crisis, 
then steadily coming to the fore, acted to aggravate such tendency. 
As the immigrants were curtailed under forcible measures of restriction, 
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however, it became evident that the issue of immigration posed a most urgent 
problem for Western capitalists. Chronic unemployment on a major scale and 
the existence of surplus population, foreshadowing an imminent economic 
crisis, had inevitably to draw serious attention of the capitalistic countries. Even 
though it was admitted that emigration was never the sole means of solving the 
problem of surplus population, it was simply undeniable that it, after all, 
'offered a provisional expedient so long as the capitalistic institution was to 
·continue. To keep a "window" open for emigration, further, world be to 
keep a hope for the unemployed and semi-unemployed elements that the 
problem of over-population was not without a possibility of eventual solution, 
and thus, prevent their class consciousness from erupting into a violent outburst. 
The decision to set up an emigration committee following the inauguration 
of the I. L. O. (International Labor Organization) in 1919 after the end of 
the first World War, was a manifestation of the consciousness that world 
capitalism faced a crisis. A sharp conflict of interests among the emigration 
and immigration countries, however, obstructed a smooth and satisfactory de-
velopment, while the 1. L. O. failed to take even a step forward in the situ-
ation. The conference on immigration, held in Rome, 1925, under the initia-
tive of Italy, failed to achieve anything. 
The issue of emigration again came to the fore in Europe following the 
close of the second World War, under the pressure of a surplus population on 
the European Continent, and, for a second time, the 1. L. O. found itself charged 
with the task of finding a way out. The urgency of the issue was evident because 
opportunities for immigrants had in the meantime been materially curtailed in 
many countries, where more stringent measures of control had to be taken. In 
the face of this, the necessity of international collaboration was felt more 
keenly than after the first World War. The consciousness of a crisis facing the 
world capitalistic mechanism prompted the 1. L. O. in 1948, to formulate a 
Manpower Programme as a measure for the realization of perfect employment, 
and, as a means for that purpose, to convene a preparatory conference on 
emigration in Geneva, between April and May 1950, when it was proposed 
that the O.E.E.C. (Organization of European Economic Cooperation) initiated 
under American leadership, be asked to extend financial aid for the furtherance 
of the programme, while in October, 1951, an International Emigration Confer-
ence was held in Naples, when the 1. L. O. took the initiative to propose 
an ambitious plan to systematically emigrate a total of 1,700,000 Europeans 
during the coming five years.') 
While it need not be reiterated that the political, economic as well as 
(2) I.L.O.;" The I.L.O and Migration Problem" International Labour Review, Feb., 1952. 
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strategic inportance of Europe relative to America brought the surplus popu-
lation there into limelight in connection with the projected solution of the issue 
of international migration, such move will at once besepak the impending crisis 
facing the system of the world domination by Western Imperialistic countries 
under the hegemony of the United States. The principle of "priority for 
European immigrants" is unmistakeably in evidence here. It was ironical, 
however, that the LL.O's Proposal at the Naples parley was not adopted, be-
cause it evidently conflicted with American interests.') The Belgian govern-
ment, then, under an American initiative, moved to convoke an international 
talk in migrants, which, being held at Brussels in November, 1951, saw a reso-
lution on a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee on the Movement of 
Migrants from Europe adopted. On the basis of the resolution, the Provisional 
Committee got underway the following year. Financed by $ 50,000 annually 
donated by each of the 26 member countries (60 % of the entire expenses 
being borne by the United States) and various other monetary donations, the 
Committee has been subsidizing the countries concerned in transporting their 
respective migrants, the number of emigrants thus thus aided amounting to 
number of emigrants thus aided amounting to about 300,000 persons by 1955. 
While it may not be denied that such effort for inter;ational cooperation 
amounted to a contribution, though small, to the worldwide migration policy, 
it has nevertheless brought no change whatsoever in the decrease in the actual 
number of people migrating, as has already been alluded to. 
japan offers no exception to the above statement. In her case, the problem 
of emigration was relegated ,to the background for several years following 
her defeat in war. With the coming into effect of her peace treaty and her 
subsequent return to world economy, however, the problem again came up 
to the fore, and, ever since 1953, increasingly louder voices have been raised 
for its solution. It is interesting to note that the tendency coincided with the 
increase in her potential surplus popUlation in farming districts and a similar 
increase in the chronical surplus population in urban areas, made inevitable in 
the course of the progress of multitude of contradictions inherent in japan's 
economy. In short, the issue of emigration· became a target of attention in 
japan as her unemployment began to assume alarming proportions. While the 
problem was first taken up as an issue in December, 1952, a total of 22,000 
persons migrated under government subsidy during the period between 1953 
and 1957, while those sailing with private funds during the same period 
numbered 4,000, most of them migrating to Central and South American 
'COuntries, mostly to Brazil. 
(3) Ibid. 
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Table I. Migrants under Government Subsidy 
~ I 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 I 1957 total Countries I 
Brazil 54 1,480 3,524 2,659 4,370 5,172 17,259 
Paraguay 
- 18 208 647 1,074 1,507 3,454 
Argentina 
- -
2 117 23 57 199 
Dominica 
- ! - - - 565 299 864 
Bolivia 
- -
7 87 3 377 474 
Venezuela 
- - -
3 6 23 32 
Colombia 
- - - -
2 3 5 
Mexico 
- - -
1 4 1 6 
Chile 




America - - - - 118 - 118 
Total 54 1,498 3,741 3,514 6,168 7,439 22,414 i 
Table 2. Migrants with Private Funds 





1,471 I 682 442 3,738 
Paraguay - i - - - 4 - 4 
Argentina 47 13 23 46 37 43 209 
Dominica - - - - 5 - 5 
Bolivia 3 
- 5 3 1 6 18 
Venzue]a 2 
- - -
5 3 10 
Colombia - 4 - 13 5 6 28 
Mexico 8 
-
2 9 22 29 70 
Peru 
-
1 - - 5 89 95 
Total 144 399 708 1,542 766 618 4,177 
It shall be noted that the total number of emigrants registered during these 
six years was nearly equivalent to an annual average of government-sponsored 
migrants to Brazil during the pre-war years 1932-34, when Japanese migration 
to that country was already on a decrease. 
After the World War II, the issue of migration in Japan has undergone 
a qualitative metamorphosis in the same way as in Europe. This does not 
confine itself to a decrease in the number of migrants; it, in essence, is charac-
terized by the circumstance that the question is taken up as a factor for the 
sustenance of the organism of world hegemony enjoyed by American capital-
ism. The fact has earlier been pointed out in connection with the issue of 
European migrants, where the leading role of America is more obvious than 
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elsewhere, while it may be predicted that the steady decrease in the number 
of migrants as well as the increasingly stringent measures of control against 
the immigrants foreshadowed the inefficacy of such new approach to the 
problem. 
A clarification of the situation, as pertaining to Japan, will be attempted 
with a brief retrospect into the past history of Japanese migration. 
ll. Process of DevelopDlent of Japanese Migration 
--Its Characteristic Features and Changes 
It may be safely stated that a full-fledged Japanese migration was started 
with the sending of the so-called government-contract emigrants to Hawaii in 
1885. The move was preceded by an aggravation of the domestic situation 
involving an acute pauperisation of her farming population and lower-graded 
laborers following the adoption in 1881 of a deflationary economic policy by 
the then Finance Minister Prince Masayoshi Matsukata, which entailed a sharp 
drop in commodity prices and industrial inactivity as well as the consolidation 
of the semi-feudalistic land ownership aided by a dwindling popular clamor 
for civil rights. 
After 1884, more and more Japanese began to migrate, the tendency be-
coming even more apparent after the economic crisis of 1890. By 1894, no less 
then 27,000 Japanese had sailed to Hawaii. There was another main stream 
of migration during the period--it was sailing to Korea, and this was sig-
nificant as foreshadowing the future course of Japanese migration, at a time when 
her modern industrial capitalism was still in the making. With the formu-
lation of the Migration Protection Law in 1896 after the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894-95 (not intended for protecting migrants but for supervising migration 
companies, this Law, with a few minor revisions, still remains in force), the 
economic crises of 1897 and 1900-1 and the promUlgation of the Public Peace 
Policing Law in 1900, as a turning point, Japanese migration showed a sub-
stantial increase by several times as compared with what it had been prior to 
the Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese settlers, during this period and up to the 
imposition of restrictive measures following the conclusion of the Japanese-
American gentleman's agreement and the Japanese-Canadian Pact in 1907 (the 
reasons for which have been explained earlier) sailed to such points, mostly, 
lying on a line extending from Hawaii.4J 
(4) The anti-Japanese immigrant moves in America and Canada were afoot as early as 1887. 
After the sending of the government contract migrants was suspended in June, 1894. the 
contract migrants was suspended in June. 1894, the business was placed in the hands of 
private interests, with no positive measures being adopted up to the Russo-Japanese war of 
1904-5, probably because the Japanese government, in view of violent anti-Japanese moves 
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After the first World War, the migration eastward from Japan swung to the 
Central and South America, especially Brazil. Following the Japanese-American 
pact of 1907, the movement against Japanese. settlers further intendified; 
Japanese were denied land ownership (1913), and were placed under serioUs re-
strictions regarding the acquisition of citizenship, and, in 1924, the Anti-Japa-
nese Immigration Law was passed. This virtually tolled the knell for Japanese 
immigration. In 1923, the Japanese, as a matter of fact, were banned from 
entering Canada.') 
In sharp contrast to the intensified movement against Japanese migration 
eastward, increasing. numbers of Japanese moved to the Asiatic mainland in the 
wake of Japanese occupation South Saghalin (Karafuto), the Kwantung Leased 
Territory and the leased area along the South Manchria Railway as a sequel 
to Japan's victory in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese War, Japan's annexation of 
Korea in 1910, and the increasing momentum attached to the popular opinion 
that Japanese migration should be concentrated on Manchuria and Korea.') 
Japan's migration westward, thus replacing the eastward movement, persisted 
up to the time of the Pacific War of 1941-45. 
Following the "rice riots" (Kome Soda) of 1918, the reactionary post-
war crisis of 1919 and banning of Japanese immigrants in America and 
Canada, the Japanese government faced the necessity to formulate positive 
measures on migration, whether directed eastward or westward. South American 
countries, especially Brazil, were singled out as the most important area for 
in evidence in America, Canada and other areas, was reluctant to flUther offe'nd their senti. 
ments, Japan, at that time. had specific reasons to shun any occasions to come into conflict 
with both America and Britain, for she was still under the yoke of the" unequal" treaties 
concluded with these countries at the hands of the defunct Tokugawa Shogunate. and was 
wholeheartedly endeavoring for a fundamental revision of these treaties. The same circum-
stance, again, explains Japan's failure to positively undertake migration to the South.Asia, 
although such had always been made an issue of. 
On the other hand, restriction on Chinese and Korean settlers in Japan started in 1899. 
Following annexing of Korea in 1910, however, the Korean nationals were exempted' from 
such restrictions. 
Special attention should perhaps be paid to the fact that a Kojiro Nishikawa, in the f'Shu_ 
kan Heimin Shim bun" (or Weekly People's Newspaper), No. 44, 1904, voiced opposition to 
overseas migration on the grounds that such was after all nothing more than 'shifting laborers-
to capitalistic exploitation of one country to another. 
(5) Japanese emigration to Austration to Australia was completely shut out by dint of the 
Settlers Limitation Law, 1902. 
(6) it is interesting to note that in February" 1909, when the afore-mentioned argument w.as 
corning to the fore, Dr. Hajime Kawakami (before professing Marxism), in the .. Nippon 
Keizai Shimbun" or Japan's New Economic Review, opposed migration on the grounds that 
it meant deprivation of national manpower. Dr. Kawakami, criticizing an article on mi-
gration by Dr. Susumu Kawazu, printed in the March 3, 1908, issue of the same journal, 
asserted that migration would not contribute to the progress of national economy and that 
the ultimate objective of a national economy should consist in the "taking_in" of'overseas 
settlers. but not in the Ie release" of such migrants. 
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Japanese settlers. As initial measures to encourage Japanese migration to these 
countries, the government moved to subsidize the organs charged with the 
migration business (1921), and, in 1923, decreed that the settlers be exempted 
from the payment of sailing fees, and, finally, undertook to bear all the ex-
penses of their voyage. In 1926, construction of emigration ships, destined for 
Brazil, was subsidized by the government. The financial crisis of 1927 found 
the government more and more energetically concentrating on 1;he encourage-
ment of Japanese migration. In that year, the government decided to set up 
a settlers training center in Kobe, formulate a law on an overseas emigration 
cooperative and on-the-spot loaning of funds. 
In 1929, when the world was gripped in a global business depression, an 
Overseas Affairs Ministry was established for streamlining all affairs pertaining 
to overseas migration, while, as a means to counter economic difficulties faced 
by farming communities, the government, in 1932, proceeded to not only ex-
empt the intended settlers from paying the sailing expenses but further to pay 
them special allowances of encouragement. In 1933, another settlers training 
center was established in Nagasaki for the benefit of the Japanese intending to 
sail to the South Seas regions for settlement.') 
On the other hand, the Japanese government, after the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5, had an eye on increasing Japanese" farmer emigrants" to 
newly-acquired colonial territories. First, in 1902, and, then, in 1906, the 
government sponsored migration of agricultural settlers to Formosa and Sagha-
lin (Karafuto), respectively--emigration to Formosa was suspended in 1910 
as it proved to be a failure--while the Toya Takushoku Kaisha (or the Ori-
ental Development Co., Ltd.), in 1902, embarked upon a big-scale agricultural 
development and immigration of Japanese settlers in Korea. In Manchuria, 
plans ware formulated in 1914 to settle exsoldiers released from local Japanese 
garrisons. A series of positive measures followed, including the extension of its 
activities into Manchuria of the T% Takushoku in 1917, the establishment of 
the Toa Kangyo Kaisha (or the East Asia Agricultural Development Co., Ltd.) 
under the sponsorship of the Manchuria Railway Company, in 1922, and 
the inauguration of the Dairen Noji Kaisha (or the Dairen Agricultural Co., 
(7) In 1919 followmg the outbreak of the "rice riots ". the Korean Travellers Identification 
Regulations. although provisionally, were promulgated for the purpose of controlling Korean 
workers :sailing Lo Japan. The Koreans were banned from coming to Japan between the 
period immmediately after the great earthquake disaster of 1923 and June in the following 
year. Such ban remained in force after July, 1928. up to the start of the China Incident. 
According to the 1930 national census, the number of Koreans settling in Japan amounted 
to 419,009. Following the start of hostilities with Nationalist China; a drastic increase in 
their number was registered (most of them coming to make up for the deficiency in Japan's 
manpOWer), and in 1942, the number stood at no less that 1.200,000 persons. Most of them 
Were forced to engage in heavy manurl labor. while their wages. on an average, stood at 
mere one.half of was paid to Japanese workers. 
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Ltd) financed by the South Manchuria Railway Company in 1929. The settling 
of Japanese farmers in Manchuria was in full swing after the Manchurian 
Incident, when Japan's Manchuria policy became to occupy a predominantly 
big momentum as compared with the policy of migration directed against 
other areas. 
In 1922, the Minister of Colonial Affairs worked out a broad outline of 
plans for agricultural settlement in Manchuria, the program for the first year 
of which called for the settelement of 100,000 families over a range of ten 
years. (The plan, later further expanded, proved impractical). The government 
took a number of measures of encouragement, including subsidies for settling 
expenses, while, in 1935, the Manshtl Takushoku Kaisha (or the Manchuria 
Developement Co., Ltd.) was established to see to it that ample farmlands be 
secured for the Japanese who were enabled to have loans advanced more or 
less freely. This period witnessed both the Japanese army and officialdom 
joining their forces in a move to encourage Japanese migration to Manchuria, 
various plans then worked out including, among others, the ambitious plan 
formulated by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs, envisaging sending of one 
million families during the following two decades. In some cases, even plans 
were advanced for moving whole viIlage communities to Manchuria. 
The tendency gained further impetus following a revision of the Brazilian 
immigration law in 1934, resulting in further restrictions imposed on Japanese 
immigration. The emphasis placed on migration to Manchuria was eloquently 
manifested in the fact that, during 1931-37 period, while Japanese emigrants 
there witnessed an average increase of 100,000 persons per year (although agricultur-
al imrnigramts, on which the government placed the greatest emphasis, totalled 
mere 4,000 persons during the 1932-37 period), Japanese immigrants in Brazil, 
during the same period, numbered mere 20,000 on a yearly average. For 
particulars, refer to the following table. 
Table 3. Number of Japanese Residents in Foreign Countries 
Years I 1900 I 1913 I 1935 
Total I 161,365 I 755,375 I 2,313,444 




Formosa 37,954 133,937 269,798 
Ex.colonial 
K wantung prov.} 47,354 157,835 
territories Manchuria 3,243 43,403 322,394 
China 16,947 56,106 
South Seas - - 50.657 
I Total 57,026 527,908 1,753,322 
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Hawaii 57,486 88,526 151,285 
U.S. Mainland 32,493 77,696 112,418 
Nonh 
, Canada 2,561 12,253 20,183 America 
Mexico 45 2,737 5,470 
Total 92,585 181,212 289,356 
I 
I I I Philippines 
167 4,894 21,468 
South-east Australia 3,425 3,514 1,664 
I Malaya I 
I 
Asia 926 5,166 
I 
6,487 
I Total 4,518 13,574 29,619 
I ! 
! Brazil I 9 I 11,893 192,823 South I Peru 694 I 4,858 21,550 




17,393 I 220,064 
Asiatic Russia 3,593 4,595 2,383 
Others 2,580 10,693 18,700 
(Remark) Based on the "Empire's Statistical Yearbook ". 
"Colonial Statistics" and f' Table of Japanese Residing in Overseas 
Areas ". The figures do not include Koreans and Formosans. 
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While it is hoped that the preceding lines have clarified in outlines the 
past history of migration and migration policy as pursued in japan, the quali-
tative features of japanese overseas settlers will be studied in the lines that 
follow. 
It stands to record that an overwhelming majority of japanese migrants 
to Hawaii, the American mainland, Mexico, Canada and Brazil consisted of 
agricultural settlers, followed by fishermen in numbers. Especially in the case 
of Brazil, the japanese sailing there were predominently farmers. The situation 
was different in the case of migration to japan's former colonial territories, 
for, there, farming and fishing settlers were a mere minority, a predominent 
percentage being occupied by government officials, industrial and transport 
workers and businessmen, who settled more in urban districts than in rural 
areas. 
That a majority of japanese migrants eastward consisted of farmers, with 
other categories of occupation being seldom seen among these japanese, was 
obviously due to the fact that most of them were very inadequately equipped 
with funds, while at the same time, European settlers, with their control over 
local industries, presented an impenetrable barrier to the newcomers from japan. 
In agriculture, manual labor constituted a major factor of competition, and heavy 
but cheap labor offered by the japanese settlers, in spite of various oppressive 
moves in the lands where they migrated, enabled them to place themselves in a 
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superior position over the European counterparts, whose standards of living were 
comparatively higher. 
The primary factor which explains the negligible number of agricultural 
migrants to Japan's old colonies, on the other hand, consisted in the fact that 
most of migrants, as a matter of fact, immigrated with Japan's imperialistic 
penetration of and control over these areas, amply backed, as they were, by 
Japanese' State authority and capital, and, in this sense, they were colonisers 
rather than immigrants. Operation of strong colonial ruling organisations as 
well as preparation and management of modern industrial, transport, mining and 
credit mechanisms would be simply unthinkable unless supported by a certain 
level of education and living standards, and the Japanese settlers, filling these 
qualifications, naturally, were absorbed predominently in these organisations and 
businesses. 
Secondly it is noted that Japanese industrial hegemony, thus consolidated 
with State authority and capital, gradually overwhelmed the native industries, 
forcing the local populace to take up farming as the sole means of subsistence. 
Their inferior standards of living and conditions of labor under which they 
toiled made it out of question for the Japanese to effectively compete with them 
as agricultural workers. It was only under a strong back-up by the military 
and economic prowess of Japan, their homeland, that the Japanese agricultural 
settlers in the colonial territories could either take or buy up lands from the 
native farmers and force the latter into the status of tenant farmers in the same 
way as traditional landowners in Japan would. The policy of settling Japa-
nese farmers in the old colonial areas, in spite of its evident failure, continued 
to be viewed with importance, only because, through them, Japan could take 
hold of land in these regions at the same time that the agricultural settlements 
actually meant much in terms of Japan's national defence. And, thus viewed, 
such policy signified considerably more than as a mere means of alleviating the 
situation of over-population in Japan proper. 
It is obvious that the importance with which settlements of agricultural 
immigrants in Manchuria were viewed, especially after the Manchuria Incident, 
emanated from the understanding that they would form a virtual bulwark a-
gainst a possible Soviet invasion from the north. That these farming settlers, in 
spite of a very high degree of protection extended them, could not succeed as 
settlers, however, was entirely due to the persistent resistance offered by the 
native farmers as well as to the various circumstances described earlier.') 
Both of these different categories of emigrants, however, had one ,thing 
(B) The "Manshu Kika" (or Travels in Manchuria) by Kensaku Shimaki, (1940) offers a 
most remarkable reportage on the various difficulties in which Japanese farming immigrants 
in Manchuria found themselves in these years. 
THE PROBLEM OF JAPANESE EMIGRATION 51 
in common, because they, in essence, were both a product of contradictions 
inherent in the semi-feudalistic capitalism of Japan. A majority of emigrants 
consisted of destitute farmers who were forced out of their land under the 
pressure of semi-feudalistic landownership and capitalism affiliated to them, 
while others belonged to the classes of unemployed or pseudo-unemployed 
workers similarly conditioned. 
The famous prize-winning novel, by Tatsuzo Ishikawa, entitled "Saba" 
(or The People), 1935, dealing with Japanese emigrants to Brazil as its theme, 
and another by Den Wada, called" Ohinata-mura" (or Ohinata Village), 1939, 
describing Japanese settlers in Manchuria, vividly delineated how such negative 
aspects of farming communities in Japan constituted the main motive force 
compelling the farmers to migrate overseas. The stream of migrants, sent out 
under the obvious impact of "narrow land and too many people", after all, 
served to conceal a multitude of contradictory factors infesting Japanese farming 
communities, and retard the solution of various problems attendant upon them, 
which, combined, contributed to the maintenance of the hereditarily feudalistic 
position of landowners, at the same time that they helped make it possible for 
the Japanese Imperialists to keep up their undisputed sway. And, the avowed 
"need of migration" was a plausible excuse for justifying Japan's Imperialistic 
advances on the Continent. Thus, it is known that both of the two different 
streams of Japanese emigrants, eastward and westward, in spite of their os-
tensible difference in category and quality, were, essentially idential in that they 
were both a ring in Japan's comprehensive Imperialistic policy; they were 
twins born of a womb.O) 
Another fact which characterises Japan's position vis-a-vis emigration is 
the meagre number of emigrants sent out. While no definite statistics are 
available on the number of emigrants sent during the 60-year period between 
1868, immediately after the Meiji Restoration, and 1935, it would be safe to 
assume, in the light of the above-listed table of Japanese residents abroad, that 
the number stood at around 2,000,000 at a maximum (excluding those born 
abroad and students enrolled in foreign schools). The Total of actual enigrants 
number, no doubt, could have amounted more than 2,000,000, because above 
number only shows residents in that time. Even then, the total figure would 
be around 3,500,000, an average of 50,000 per year. 
The figure is surprisingly low compared, for instance, with 21,000,000 
persons, an average of 300,000 per year, migrating from England to America 
and elsewhere between 1846 and 1924, and, with 17,000,000, an average of 
(9) Refer" Teikokushugi' (or Imperialism) by Shusui Katoku (1901). as the first c1earcut 
refutation of the ideology which attempts to justify Japan's Imperialistic advance, on the 
grounds of the "narrowness of Japan's territory and her over-population". 
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340,000 a year, sent out from Italy during the 50-year period between 1876 
and 1926. The figure for Japan is especially significant as indicating the 
inefficacy of overseas migration as a means to solve the problem of over-popu-
lation at home, although it is unrefutable that, even with such large numbers 
of people sent out as emigrants, both Britain and Italy were, as a matter of 
fact, far from fundamentally solving a similar question facing them, re-
spectively. 
The causes for the comparative numerical inferiority of Japanese migrants 
should be found in the fact that (1 ) inasmuch as Japan lagged behind the 
Western powers in organizing itself on a capitalistic pattern, Imperialism had 
its way when Japan was about to think seriously about the issue of over-
population, and, thus, Japanese settlers had to face greater obstacles in their way 
than European (mostly Italian) immigrants; that (2) Japan's old colonial 
territories, under the impact of worldwide business depression, were suffering from 
a chronic over-population and were not in a position to effectively absorb 
immigrants from Japanese home islands; and that ( 3) Japan's semi-feudalistic 
landownership, still found in force in farming districts, worked to impede a 
clearcut conflict of classes in the rural areas as well as the liberation of 
farmers from their lands, which, while allowing Japanese emigrants to tend to be 
mere seekers of money, offered the possibilities for Japan's agricultural com-
munities to become a vast pool for a potential over-population--although 
such aspects of the situation had to undergo a process of modification, keeping 
pace with the evolving and deepening of contradictions inherent in the capi-
talistic system in J apan.'O) 
It is ironical, thus, to note that the very theorization about the need of 
emigration as worked out through Japan's Imperialistic ambitions proved to be 
a theoretical ground on which the movement of Japanese emigrants abroad 
had to be curtailed. 
Then, how has the issue of emigration facing Japan changed after the 
second World War? Japan's defeat in the war resulted in a complete wiping 
out of Japanese settlers, who, during the past 78 years of migration, had a-
mounted to more than three millions in number, from her old overseas colonies. 
The door to migration westward was closed. True, following the taking effect 
of the peace treaty, a small window was opened to Japanese movement to 
Japanese movement to Central and South America, but its scale, unquestiona-
(10) While it is recorded that 63.4% of Japanese immigrants in HawaiI, during the January, 
1885-December, 1895 period definitely settled there, (the percentage would be lower if those 
sailing on to the American mainland were taken into consideration), their counterparts in 
Brazil settled down to the percentage of no less than 90.5% (the highest ever recorded 
throughout the world) during 1908-26. During the 1925-29 period, the percentage further 
rose to 93,5%. 
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bly, was considerably smaller. Indicative of the situation was the fact that, III 
1946, a new Brazilian legislation intended to ban Japanese immigration, was 
rejected in the Brazilian parliament by the margin of a single vote! 
The decrease in the number of emigrants is not the only circumstance 
which charasterises the present situation, however. What characterises it most 
strongly is a change in the factors which necessitate it, and this has been amply 
clarified as a result of an on-the-spot investigation conducted by the present 
writer and his colleague at the Emigrants Center in Kobe.lll This is to say 
that those sections of the Japanese population which are most prominently 
under the influence of various contradictory elements resulting from Japan's 
subservience to America, are migrating. Secondly, the fact is characteristic, 
again, that America extends assistance, either direct or indirect, to Japanese 
migration, the fact being unmistakeably demonstrated in the establishment of 
the Japan Overseas Migration Encouragement Company financed with an 
immigration loan by three American banks (amounting in sum to $15,000,000,). 
The American assistance, it is noted, does not end here; it even extends to the 
good services for enabling those Japanese employees who have been discharged 
or about to be discharged from U. S. forces to migrate overseas. It is no 
secret that the diplomatic negotiations conducted by the Japanese government 
concerning Japanese migration to Central and South America depend for their 
success or failure on the assistance extendable from the United States. 
The case of Okinawa, indeed, indicates most bluntly the extent of A-
merican guidance and assistance in this connection. Okinawa has always been an 
area noted for a large number of of emigrants sailing out. It is an established 
fact that during the post-war years many Okinawans have been desprived of 
their lands under the military rule of the Americans, who have turned the 
islands into a strong defence bastion. Presumably in view of this and cognizant 
of this fact, America has undertaken specific measures of assisting the islanders 
in migrating to overseas areas. In 1954, when the Okinawa problem was 
gradually coming to the fore in Japan, America moved to set up in Okinawa 
a migration financing safe to take charge of loaning sailing expenses and funds 
needed for settling down as agricultural migrants. To the safe America con-
tributed a sum of $160,000, while part of $4,000,000 fund for economic aid 
earmarked under the Point Four Program, was loaned to Bolivia, the land 
where the Okinawan settler are destined to. Viewed in this light, it may well 
be safe to say that these Okinawan settlers are destined not only to settle the 
antagonism and resentment of those who lost their land against America, but 
(Ii) K. Ono, .. The Report on the japanese enigrants for Brari1" (in japanese), 1955, The 
Research series of the Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University No.2. 
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also to serve as spearheads in the American attempt to establish its undis~ 
puted hegemony in under-developed countries. 
This fact is highly significant in that it denotes the change of master in 
post-war years as far as Japan's enrigration issue is concerned, for, before the 
war, Japanese migration policy virtually served to the Japanese Imperialism. 
A new master has now taken over--a military setup subservient to America 
and American Militalism itself. 
m. Conclusion. 
Small territory and big population--most of the Japanese, indeed, are 
accustomed to this theme taught into their brains ever since their primary 
school days. Now, a question arises - is this true? The answer should be 
negative. Against 5,400,000 cho-bu (a cho-bu is 2.45 acres) of land now under 
cultivation, a roughly equal area of land in Japan still remains to be developed. 
Official investigations reveal that, of the lands already developed, 1,110,000 cho-bu 
suffer from a shortage of irrigation water, 720,000 cho-bu needs improvement of 
irrigation systems, and more than 300,000 cho-bu of rice fields need improvement 
in various aspects. Thus viewed, the adage: "small land and big population" 
will have to be modified to an adnrission that large areas of land require ex-
pansion and improvement while there is a big army of the unemployed and 
semi-unemployed. Failure to initiate expansion and improvement of arable 
lands has entailed an alarming proportion of devastatation and curtailment of 
cultivable areas (the acreage stood at 5,446,000 cho-bu in 1952 and at 6,027,000 
cho-bu back in 1934-36). This, on the other hand, has produced a relative in-
crease in population in surplus. 
What is at stake now is never the purely abstract sige of either land or 
population; it obviously is the present status.of Japanese capitalistic mechanism, 
which is so positioned that it must function at the behest of American Mili-
tarism. Enrigration and all political measures taken therefor, thus, will be 
reduced to a mere exigency by which its background organisation be protected 
and maintained, never amounting to anything working for the succor of the 
migrants themselves or the solution of the problem of poverty on the part of 
this overpopulated homeland. A definite proof is the past history of Japanese 
emigration, which, in a word, was a history of tragedy, and this, naturally, 
will make it self-evident that a real solution of the problem of emigration never 
lies in mere birth control or execution of an improved policy of emigration. 
